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Abstract
Introduction: Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was a seminal genomic technology discovered,
developed, and patented in an industry setting. Since the first of its core patents expired in March,
2005, we are in a position to view the entire lifespan of the patent, examining how the intellectual
property rights have impacted its use in the biomedical community. Given its essential role in the
world of molecular biology and its commercial success, the technology can serve as a case study
for evaluating the effects of patenting biological research tools on biomedical research.
Case description: Following its discovery, the technique was subjected to two years of in-house
development, during which issues of inventorship and publishing/patenting strategies caused friction
between members of the development team. Some have feared that this delay impeded subsequent
research and may have been due to trade secrecy or the desire for obtaining lucrative intellectual
property rights. However, our analysis of the history indicates that the main reasons for the delay
were benign and were primarily due to difficulties in perfecting the PCR technique. Following this
initial development period, the technology was made widely available, but was subject to strict
licensing terms and patent protection, leading to an extensive litigation history.
Discussion and evaluation: PCR has earned approximately $2 billion in royalties for the various
rights-holders while also becoming an essential research tool. However, using citation trend
analysis, we are able to see that PCR's patented status did not preclude it from being adopted in a
similar manner as other non-patented genomic research tools (specifically, pBR322 cloning vector
and Maxam-Gilbert sequencing).
Conclusion: Despite the heavy patent protection and rigid licensing schemes, PCR seems to have
disseminated so widely because of the practices of the corporate entities which have controlled
these patents, namely through the use of business partnerships and broad corporate licensing,
adaptive licensing strategies, and a "rational forbearance" from suing researchers for patent
infringement. While far from definitive, our analysis seems to suggest that, at least in the case of
PCR, patenting of genomic research tools need not impede their dissemination, if the technology
is made available through appropriate business practices.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades, there has been increasing con-
cern that patents on biological tools could impede their
dissemination and use in the research community. In an
attempt to examine the extent to which these concerns
might be valid, we sought to explore a number of case his-
tories of seminal genomic technologies and study how
intellectual property concerns, licensing, litigation, and
business practices affected their development and dissem-
ination. Our work with the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) seems to present a particularly interesting case
study for analyzing these potential impediments to access
by researchers. Because PCR, unlike most other early bio-
logical research tools, was developed in a corporate set-
ting, its development was subjected to considerations of
patenting and licensing from its very inception.
The technology was also protected by robust patent rights
and heavily licensed, earning large profits for the entities
which have controlled the patents. And yet, PCR has man-
aged to disseminate broadly in the molecular biology
world, becoming an indispensable research tool
employed in nearly every biological field. Since the core
PCR patents began to expire in March, 2005, we are
poised to view the entire "lifespan" of the patents and
assess how the patenting and business considerations
affected the technology throughout its entire 20 year tra-
jectory.
Overall, our study finds that intellectual property rights
and licensing have not prevented PCR from being widely
adopted and played little role in the initial period of
secrecy during its initial in-house development stage. This
comes as a result of deliberate business practices on the
part of the patent holders, which have given researchers
broad access to the technology.
Case description
Discovery and development in an industry setting
The history of PCR provides an interesting foil to the tra-
ditional development of biological research tools, which,
throughout the 1970s and early 80s occurred typically in
the academic environment. This case study incorporates
many elements not traditionally found in the realm of
university research.
The industrial culture at Cetus contributed greatly to the
emergence of PCR. The eclectic environment afforded the
research team at Cetus the opportunity to take advantage
of a wide variety of experts and technical backgrounds, all
of which would be crucial to the development of the tech-
nology. The commercial nature of the company also
granted researchers the flexibility to work on developing
PCR, while allowing Cetus to capitalize financially on its
lucrative applications.
The norms of proprietary research required a business
plan which consisted of perfecting the technological
methods, acquiring intellectual property protection, and
only then considering other forms of public disclosure,
including publication. This stands in stark contrast to the
traditional academic model, in which openness and dis-
semination were foremost, with patents or licensing reve-
nue secondary. As a result of this commercial mindset, it
can be argued that PCR did not initially disseminate as
quickly through the scientific community as it would have
if discovered at an academic institution. Once publicly
announced, however, the company had an incentive to
find many uses, so long as such uses contributed revenue
streams, or were at least revenue neutral. Despite such the-
oretical concerns over intellectual property rights, most of
the reasons for the two-year delay between PCR's discov-
ery and patenting/public disclosure are rather benign and
not the result of a deliberate strategy to maintain trade
secrecy, except to the extent that the invention had to
remain private until a patent application was filed, in
order to preserve worldwide patent rights.
However, the rigors of the business environment also
threatened the existence of PCR, as management initially
viewed its development as diverting resources away from
the company's main business objectives. Thus, at several
points during its development, those working on the tech-
nology were forced to demonstrate not only its technical
feasibility, but also its profitability. Unlike researchers
working in an academic setting, showing that PCR worked
as a basic research tool was not enough; it had to be made
applicable to a field relevant to Cetus's business plan, pri-
marily through human diagnostics.
Discovery
The initial discovery of the polymerase chain reaction
technique is attributed to Kary Mullis, a chemist who won
the Nobel Prize in 1993 for his work on PCR. Mullis
found himself at Cetus in 1979 after studying chemistry at
Georgia Institute of Technology, biochemistry at UC Ber-
keley, and doing post-doctoral work in pharmaceutical
chemistry at UC San Francisco. His work at Cetus focused
on synthesizing oligonucleotides, short segments of DNA
usually less than 20 nucleotide bases in length, for use by
other researchers within the company. He became head of
the DNA synthesis lab in 1981, and automated the pro-
duction of oligonucleotides, making the process of DNA
synthesis much less laborious. With productivity on the
rise, Mullis remembers, "we nucleotide chemists found
ourselves successfully underemployed. Laboratory
machines, which we loaded and watched, were making
almost more oligonucleotides than we had room for in
the freezer...in my laboratory at Cetus, there was a fair
amount of time available to think and to putter [1]."Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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Mullis began experimenting with oligonucleotides and
the denaturation/renaturation properties of DNA. Using
computer programs, he attempted to quantify the effects
of time and temperature on double-stranded DNA, a
poorly-understood subject at the time [1]. Mullis made
extensive use of iterative loops, a process involving
repeated calculation of a formula where the result of each
calculation becomes the input for the next calculation.
This work showed Mullis that iterative exponential
growth could be a very powerful tool for generating large
numbers quickly. With the combination of these two
ideas: understanding of the complex denaturation/rena-
turation properties of DNA and the concept of the itera-
tive loop, the stage was set for the breakthrough.
According to Mullis, that breakthrough moment hap-
pened one April night in 1983 on the long, winding road
from San Francisco to Mendicino [1]. It was on this drive
that Mullis brought ideas together for a technique that he
envisioned would allow scientists to create billions of
copies of a segment of DNA in a matter of hours. After
thinking through the relatively simple process, Mullis was
convinced that, for some reason, it would not work and it
was too simple not to have been attempted. He recalls
thinking that "someone, somewhere, must have tried this
idea already. Thousands of investigators had, for various
reasons, extended single oligonucleotides with polymer-
ases; surely someone would have noticed the possibility
of a polymerase chain reaction [1]." Mullis returned to the
lab at Cetus and after exhaustive searching, found nothing
in the literature to suggest something like a polymerase
chain reaction being attempted previously.
However, it would be several months before the PCR con-
cept was tested. Rabinow posits several possible factors
that contributed to Mullis' delay: a hectic work schedule at
Cetus, a tumultuous love life, and discouraging feedback
from colleagues [2]. Mullis asserts that the delay was
largely due to two things: the time needed for him to
become familiar with the methods and techniques
required for PCR and the unwillingness of colleagues to
get involved and help with the process [3]. Mullis finally
ran his first PCR experiment on September 8, 1983,
unsuccessfully attempting to isolate a 400 base pair
stretch of the human nerve growth factor gene. His second
experiment took place in October, in which he increased
the number of cycles of the denaturing/renaturing proc-
ess, but again to no avail. He decided to change to a sim-
pler target, and switched to using the common cloning
vector pBR322. Mullis claims he saw what he believed to
be evidence of amplification on December 16, 1983. One
night, after several minor modifications to the process,
Mullis began to see faint bands on the gel, indicating he
had been successful in isolating a 25 base-pair fragments
[2].
Upon seeing the first truly successful results, Mullis
searched for someone with whom to share the news. He
went across the hall to the office of Al Halluin, Cetus's
Chief Patent Counsel, who was working late. After view-
ing the results in the dark room, Halluin congratulated
Mullis for his work and began crafting the claims for the
patent application. Halluin recalls that he was intrigued
by the notion that the PCR process could produce multi-
ple copies of DNA of similar molecular weight, which is
analogous to living polymers produced by anionic polym-
erization [4]. The attorney had filed for patents on such
polymers in a previous job and recognized the similar
importance. The next day, Halluin continued working on
a preliminary draft of the patent application, and pre-
sented the idea to Cetus's President, Dr. Robert A. Fildes.
As Halluin remembers, Fildes did not share the patent
attorney's enthusiasm: "Basically, Bob said, 'You can go
ahead and pursue it, but you better not do it at the
expense of more important things, like writing patents for
therapeutics and cancer and diagnostics [4]." The early
interaction between Mullis and Halluin is significant and
highlights a key difference between innovation occurring
in industry versus academia; not many scientists working
in academia have patent attorneys across the hall from
their labs. The industry environment clearly places
emphasis on commercialization of new technologies
from the outset.
Bolstered by what he viewed as promising results, Mullis
decided to switch to a larger, more complicated system,
working first with the 50,000 base-pair lambda phage and
then moving back to human DNA, using a 58 base-pair
section of the beta-globin gene. The beta-globin gene was
important because it is the site of the mutation that causes
sickle-cell anemia, and a source of great interest for Cetus
scientists because of its potential for diagnostic tests. In
June of 1984, Mullis presented a poster showing PCR
amplification of the beta-globin gene at the Cetus annual
scientific meeting in Monterey, but it was largely ignored
[2].
The summer of 1984 was a time of uncertainty regarding
the future of PCR and Mullis at Cetus Corporation. As a
start-up company in the fledgling biotechnology industry,
Cetus was forced to invest its resources in those projects
which seemed most likely to realize commercial success
and profitability in the short-term. The company was
focusing its efforts on diagnostics, cancer therapeutics,
and agriculture [2]. Thus, promoting the development of
PCR as a basic research tool was "looked on by top man-
agement as requiring resources that might detract from
the main goal [5]." There were also several senior
researchers who still questioned whether PCR worked as
claimed [4]. In addition, Mullis' erratic behavior had been
causing problems at work, and separate from its decisionsJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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to pursue PCR research, management was trying to decide
whether or not to fire Mullis. Despite these obstacles, Mul-
lis was relieved of his duties as head of the DNA synthesis
lab and given a one year trial period in which to focus his
work on PCR [2].
Development and dissemination of PCR
Further development of PCR focused on improving the
technique as it applied to diagnostics, which could have
immediate commercial value. Until this point, all of the
work on PCR was done by Mullis and his lab technician,
Fred Faloona. During the summer of 1984, the "PCR
group" was formed by adding Henry Erlich, Norman Arn-
heim, Randy Saiki, Glenn Horn, and Steven Scharf for the
purposes of perfecting protocols and developing applica-
tions for the technique [2]. For PCR to reach its full poten-
tial as a diagnostic and research tool, it would require the
effort of a dedicated team of scientists and skilled techni-
cians, along with occasional, reluctant support from the
Cetus management. John Sninsky, a senior scientist at
Cetus at the time, claims that the development of PCR
represents:
"The quintessential use of biotechnology in an industrial
setting, because it took advantage of larger, rather than
smaller teams of scientists to explore to its fruition an
idea. But each member of that team had brought to that
team a very different experience, really a multidisciplinary
approach, so you had the creative chemistry background
that Kary brought to the area...the enthusiasm and intelli-
gence, really, of Fred Faloona...the human genetics back-
ground and the careful experimentation in molecular
biology that Henry Erlich and Norm Arnheim and their
colleagues brought to that [6]."
The group worked throughout the summer and fall to
obtain reliable results. An experiment run by Scharf and
Faloona on November 14, 1984 provided them with
those results [6]. With solid experimental data in hand,
the group worked towards perfecting the technique. Arn-
heim and Erlich designated Saiki as the full-time techni-
cian charged with that task. However, with success came
questions about how to proceed.
Development of a new technology in the corporate envi-
ronment required developing not only publication strate-
gies, but also patenting and business strategies.
In the early months of 1985, members of the PCR group
along with Tom White, then Cetus's Vice President of
Research, visited several large corporations trying to drum
up support and investment for the diagnostics program,
including potential applications of PCR. During one of
their presentations, an audience member asked questions
that indicated he understood the idea behind PCR [2].
Furthermore, White heard through mutual friends that
Mullis was talking about PCR to people outside of Cetus.
It became clear that disclosure of the technology was on
the verge of happening, and Cetus needed to ensure that
it capitalized on the invention. Given the highly competi-
tive nature of biotechnology, it was decided that the strat-
egy would be to file patents first, and publish second.
Halluin states this strategy also took into account the gen-
eral concern for international patent filings, as they did
not want publications to preclude patenting in foreign
countries where any previous publications are viewed as
prior art [4].
The filing of the first PCR patent application (which
would later be split into two U.S. patents numbered
4,683,202 and 4,683,195) occurred on March 28, 1985.
According to Halluin, part of the reason for the delay in
filing is attributable to the fact that Janet Hasak, the per-
son whom he wanted to complete the drafting of the pat-
ent applications, was on maternity leave during most of
the summer of 1984 [4]. When Hasak returned to work in
September, she and Mullis began drafting the final ver-
sions of the patent application. Mullis states he wanted
the application to have "broad claims that would not
appear shortsighted when derivative technologies started
to appear. But I did not want them to wander...I wanted
them to say what they had to say in the least number of
words [7]." However, in formulating more general claims,
Mullis and Hasak failed to include several key concepts,
most notably a claim of the situation where the target
DNA sequence was imbedded in a larger sequence [7].
Mullis's desire for brevity would come back to haunt
Cetus later, as the company would become embroiled in
costly legal challenges, which will be discussed in further
detail below.
Having taken steps to protect the intellectual property
rights for PCR, Cetus now shifted focus to dissemination
of the new technology to the research community. While
support emerged for publicly disclosing the PCR concept,
there was some contention over how best to proceed. At
one point, Mullis suggested keeping PCR as an in-house
trade secret. Tom White recalls that "Mullis proposed sell-
ing tubes containing reagents – the mixture of which
would remain a secret – into which one had put DNA." He
remembers Mullis insisting that "people would be
amazed...at the end when they saw the huge amount of
DNA produced [2]." This plan had two major flaws: first,
researchers would be able to reverse-engineer the constitu-
tive elements, rendering it unnecessary for them to pur-
chase the materials from Cetus; and, second, some of the
patent applications which had been filed in March (those
filed abroad, where patent applications are published
after 18 months) would become public information,
unless the patent applications were abandoned. However,Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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Mullis insists that his comments on trade secrecy were
made casually: "it's not like I was going around Cetus
proselytizing that idea [3]." Additionally, some members
of Cetus management thought that disclosure of PCR in
publication would make the technology less attractive to
Kodak, who had shown interest in pursuing a diagnostics
partnership with Cetus based on PCR [2].
Ultimately, plans were made for Saiki to present PCR diag-
nostic results at the October 1985 annual meeting of the
American Society for Human Genetics. The group also
decided to publish two papers: a "theory" paper, written
by Mullis, covering the basic concept of PCR as an ampli-
fication technique, followed by an "applications" paper
demonstrating the technology's use in the human beta-
globin system, on which the group had been working [2].
Despite this plan, the team working on the applications
paper soon took the lead, confirming their results with
radioactive Southern blotting. Saiki recalls Mullis and
Faloona "wanted to do more elegant experiments. They
didn't want to use radioactivity...So they went off and
wanted to do it in a nonradioactive manner, which at the
time was very difficult [6]." Mullis states that the final
experiment he wanted to run, showing that PCR could be
done in a single copy gene in human DNA, turned out to
be much harder than he anticipated [3]. Whatever the
exact cause of the delay, the fact remained that the appli-
cations paper was ready for publication, and the Cetus
management pushed for it to be submitted to Science in
September 1985. The applications paper appeared in the
December 20, 1985 issue of Science, and acknowledges
the use of "the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) proce-
dure of Mullis and Faloona [8]." The paper reflects the
continued emphasis of those within Cetus to focus on the
commercial applications of PCR (in this case, diagnostic
testing) while largely ignoring its potential as a basic
research tool.
Publishing the theory paper now proved to be difficult.
Mullis submitted the theory paper to Nature in December
1985, and it was rejected as merely technical and unorigi-
nal. Hurriedly, Mullis submitted the manuscript to Sci-
ence, this time with an explanatory cover letter stating
precisely how the article differed from the previous PCR
paper. It was also rejected. The rejections angered Mullis,
who felt as though the credit for his invention was stolen
from him through the publication of the original Science
paper [3]. He explained that "the [applications] paper, as
it was first sort of drafted, still avoided talking directly to
how you did PCR...but by the time it got back and forth
between Science editors and Norman [Arnheim], it was
almost two-thirds of it was PCR. It told you everything
you needed to know [6]." The theory paper was finally
accepted for publication in Methods of Enzymology in May
1985, but through a series of delays, was not seen in print
until 1987 [9].
The strategy of patent first, then publish, differs signifi-
cantly from cases of technologies discovered in an aca-
demic setting. For example, Professor Sir Edwin Southern
created the technique which bears his name, the Southern
blot, while working at the MRC Mammalian Genome
Unit in 1973 [10]. During the two years between his dis-
covery and the publication of his work, Southern engaged
in a very liberal pre-publication sharing strategy. He liter-
ally drew schematics on scraps of paper and gave it to
other scientists. As word about this new blotting method
began to spread through the research community, South-
ern allowed colleagues to further disseminate the infor-
mation, requesting only that he receive acknowledgement
for the origination of the process [11], [12]. Cetus' course
of action also stands in stark contrast even to patented
technologies which were developed in academic settings.
One good example is the case of Stanford's Cohen-Boyer
patent on recombinant DNA technology, which was pat-
ented only after publication and a front-page New York
Times story heralding the technique [13].
Commercialization and intellectual property challenges
With the patent applications filed and the scientific papers
accepted for publication, the focus of the PCR project
shifted to commercialization, making PCR available to
researchers and profitable for Cetus. To accomplish these
goals, Cetus formed strategic partnerships with other cor-
porations, ensuring that outside entities would be able to
contribute their expertise to the further development of
the technology.
After spending the first three years in relative obscurity as
an in-house project, PCR was ready for its presentation to
a worldwide audience. In response to increased attention
from outside researchers and companies, Cetus realized
that it had to develop adaptable licensing schemes that
were receptive to the demands of the scientific commu-
nity. This new commitment to accessibility coincided with
PCR's explosion in popularity, as researchers around the
world continued to find still newer applications for the
technology.
Eventually, PCR would outgrow Cetus, and the rights were
acquired by Swiss pharmaceutical giant Hoffmann-La
Roche, a company with sufficient resources to both
develop the technology further and increase access for
researchers. These efforts helped lead PCR to its current
status as an indispensable, nearly ubiquitous biological
research tool.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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Final improvements and PCR's public debut
Before PCR could be fully automated and made truly mar-
ketable, the team needed to find a better polymerase
enzyme. The PCR process involved heating the DNA to 95
degrees Celsius, which had the effect of denaturing the E.
coli polymerase enzyme they were using, rendering it inac-
tive for the next round of amplification. Hence, fresh
polymerase had to be added to each cycle, causing the
process to be slow and laborious. The PCR group tested
several different thermophillic bacterial species, and even-
tually settled on Thermus aquaticus, a strain of bacteria
which had been discovered living in Yellowstone hot
springs. Because the bacteria lived in water that often
approached boiling conditions, its polymerase enzyme
had no problem remaining functional at the PCR temper-
atures [6].
Work purifying the polymerase enzyme was led by David
Gelfand and Susanna Stoffel, and with three weeks of
overtime work, the new Taq polymerase was ready to be
used in PCR experiments [2]. The thermostable properties
of the enzyme also allowed the annealing reactions (when
the polymerase enzyme reassembles the separated DNA
strands to double the desired sequence) to be carried out
at a higher temperature. The work was so significant, that
the team would eventually be granted a patent on the dis-
covery (US patent 4,889,818). The switch to Taq polymer-
ase had increased the efficacy of PCR and paved the way
for full automation via thermal cyclers (instruments
designed to heat and cool the reaction mixtures for PCR).
In short, all the elements were in place for the technique
to become a staple in nearly every molecular biology lab
in the world.
Excitement within the research community took off after
Mullis had the opportunity to present PCR at the May
1986 symposium at Cold Spring Harbor entitled "The
Molecular Biology of Homo Sapiens." Mullis recalls the
reception "was definitive...I had invented something they
could use. Everyone told me that it was new and that, fur-
thermore, it was a splendid contribution [7]." The reac-
tion from the scientific community was quick and
impressive. Halluin remembers that after Mullis' presenta-
tion, Cetus began receiving many inquiries about the
"PCR thing", causing management to look more closely at
the possibilities for further developing the technology [4].
Additionally, since his presentation at Cold Spring Har-
bor, Mullis was becoming the public face of PCR. This
ignited contention over who should receive credit for the
invention and development of the technology. Cetus
enhanced some team members' fears about loss of recog-
nition in the spring of 1986, when Mullis was given an
unprecedented $10,000 bonus as a reward for his work;
everyone else in the PCR group was given the traditional
sum of one dollar [2].
Inventorship issues and what Mullis perceived as poor
treatment from others in the PCR group caused the rift
between him and the rest of the Cetus team to grow. In
September 1986, the situation reached a boiling point,
and Mullis sat down with White to discuss their options.
After a brief exchange, they agreed that Mullis would leave
the company, receiving five months salary as severance
pay [2].
Business strategies for the emerging PCR market
As demand for PCR grew, Cetus adopted three distinct
business strategies for the three major fields in which PCR
could be marketed: human diagnostics, research applica-
tions, and forensics [5]. The diagnostics program would
follow a "hands-off" approach. The decision was made to
license rights to perform diagnostics using PCR technol-
ogy to other companies. Cetus finalized a partnership
with Kodak to create in vitro diagnostics in February of
1986. Under the terms of the agreement, Kodak and Cetus
would provide 65 percent and 35 percent of the funding,
respectively, and would share profits proportionally, as
well [14].
Cetus would capitalize on any potential research applica-
tions by manufacturing the instruments and reagents
through joint ventures. For example, Cetus entered into a
joint-venture with Perkins-Elmer to develop diagnostic
instruments and reagents for use in biomedical research in
December 1985. Perkins-Elmer Cetus Instruments (PECI)
was responsible for manufacturing the first DNA thermal
cyclers, which automated the PCR process, as well as the
necessary buffers, polymerases, and nucleotides required
to perform the technique. Under the terms of the arrange-
ment, Cetus held a 49 percent stake in the joint-venture,
while Perkins-Elmer controlled 51 percent [15]. The first
of these reagents, the "GeneAmp PCR reagent kit" and
thermal cyclers were commercially available within two
years, hitting the market in November 1987 [5].
This desire for cooperation sprang mostly from necessity.
During the mid-1980s, Cetus executives still aspired to
become a pharmaceutical company. Since the manage-
ment wanted to focus resources on the production of
drugs and therapeutics, joint enterprises were seen as the
only way to fully fund the projects not dedicated to these
goals. Sninsky summarized the business plan: "it was felt
that rather than being an instrument company, or trying
to be a therapeutics company and an instrument com-
pany, that we would put in place joint ventures or rela-
tionships such that other major players could do the
marketing and manufacturing, and we could do the earlier
feasibility and research aspects of the studies [6]." OnlyJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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the forensics applications were viewed as a business that
could be operated entirely in-house [5].
By 1986, PCR had caught on with a handful of scientists,
particularly in the area of human diagnostics. Half of the
papers published in that year using PCR used the tech-
nique specifically for diagnostic applications. Soon, the
prospects for the PCR diagnostics market were booming;
more than 50 different organizations had approached
Cetus about licensing PCR for diagnostic purposes [5].
Cetus's senior director of corporate ventures, William Ger-
ber, claimed that after a decade the total PCR diagnostics
market would be worth $1.5 billion [16].
In November 1988, with these lofty goals in mind, Cetus
announced the creation of an entire division of the com-
pany dedicated solely to the development of PCR. This
division focused primarily on creating business partner-
ships and licensing programs. Forming the division was
not only a useful administrative move, but also generated
publicity and made PCR more visible in the industry,
especially to other businesses that Cetus viewed as poten-
tial investors in the technology. With the Cetus-Kodak
partnership set to expire in December 1988, Cetus began
seeking ways to capitalize on PCR's growing popularity,
using the technology as a bargaining chip in order to
receive more favorable offers from other large co-spon-
sors, including DuPont, Abbott, and Hoffmann-La Roche
[2].
Roche represented an interesting partner for Cetus. The
Swiss pharmaceutical giant owned the patent rights to
recombinant forms of interleukin 2 (IL-2), the production
of which was one of Cetus's largest revenue sources [17].
Cetus officials were intrigued at the possibility of swap-
ping rights to PCR technology for rights to manufacture
and sell IL-2 without worrying about patent infringement
suits. After lengthy negotiations, Cetus announced on Jan-
uary 19, 1989 that the two companies had settled on
terms of the agreement: Roche would supply $30 million,
paid over five years, to fund diagnostic research. Addition-
ally, Roche would pay a significant royalty on the sale of
diagnostic products and services that were developed
through the partnership. Roche also agreed to purchase
one million shares of Cetus stock. Most importantly,
Roche granted Cetus the rights to use the IL-2 patents for
commercial purposes without fear of lawsuit [2] (see fig-
ure 1).
Early challenges to intellectual property rights
In August 1989, the American chemical giant DuPont
filed suit against Cetus, alleging the core PCR patents
('202 and '195) were not novel because the processes had
been previously described on at least three occasions in
the 1970s [18]. DuPont cited work done on the process
called "repair replication" by scientists working with Dr.
Gobind Khorana at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology [19]. In response to the suit, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) ordered that both patents'
claims be reexamined. Subsequently, the court granted a
motion by Cetus to delay the start of the trial until after
completion of the reexamination [20]. On August 23,
1990, the USPTO announced its decision to uphold the
validity of both patents, rejecting DuPont's claims that
any of the papers had fully anticipated PCR. The examiner
found the techniques described in the repair replication
papers too "indefinite and uncertain" to have made PCR
an obvious process. Furthermore, neither of the papers
mentioned the possibility of exponential replication,
which was a hallmark of the PCR process and was explic-
itly stated in two claims of the '202 patent [20].
The decision by the USPTO was a major blow to DuPont's
case. The court was allowed to consider the reexamination
findings along with secondary considerations, including
"commercial success of the patent" and "failure of others
to perform the invention," as signs that the patent was
non-obvious [20]. Given the profitable nature of reagent
and thermal cycler sales, and the nearly fifteen year gap
between Khorana's original work and the perfection of the
PCR technique by the Cetus team, these secondary consid-
erations further tipped the scales in Cetus's favor. Despite
strong witnesses on their side, including Dr. Arthur Korn-
berg from Stanford, who had received the 1959 Nobel
Prize for his pioneering work with DNA replication and
polymerases, DuPont was not able to prove that PCR had
been obvious [7]. On February 28, 1991, after two days of
deliberations, the jury issued a verdict in Cetus's favor,
echoing the USPTO's previous ruling and unanimously
upholding the validity of both the '202 and the '195 pat-
ents.
PCR outgrows Cetus
Meanwhile, outside the courtroom, PCR was becoming an
essential research tool in the molecular biology world. In
December 1989, Science selected PCR as the major scien-
tific development of the year and dubbed the Taq enzyme
its first annual "Molecule of the Year [21]." The Science
article highlighted an array of areas where PCR had been
introduced, including: diagnostic tests for Lyme disease
and AIDS, cancer diagnosis, evolutionary comparison,
forensics, paternity determination, matching organ
donors and recipients, and uses in DNA sequencing.
Along with this explosion in the use of PCR in 1989 came
increased profits from PCR reagent kits and thermal
cyclers. In that year, net sales for PECI topped $26 million,
up from $4 million just two years before. However, even
with increased revenue from PCR sales, Cetus was facing
financial trouble. The company finished the fiscal year
1990 with a net loss of more than $60 million (See FigureJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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2) [22]. Cetus was dealt another serious blow when, in
July 1990, an FDA review board failed to approve IL-2 for
treatment in the United States. The IL-2 program was of
crucial significance to the company; according to many at
Cetus, President and CEO Bob Fildes had "bet the com-
pany" on its success [6]. Following its failure, Fildes left
Cetus. With operating losses growing and a key revenue
source eliminated, Cetus was in dire straits.
Cetus's management now turned its attention toward
Hoffmann-La Roche, hoping to find a purchaser for the
bolstered PCR patents. Roche was looking to improve the
profitability of its PCR rights. Early in 1991, Roche began
a joint-venture with SmithKline Beecham in a deal
designed to expand the development of PCR diagnostic
testing services [5]. The company then entered into nego-
tiations with Cetus about the possibility of purchasing the
PCR franchise outright. The two sides eventually settled
on a number: Roche would pay Cetus $300 million in
exchange for sole ownership of rights to diagnostic uses of
PCR. The deal seemed to be a win-win for both sides.
Roche would now control the PCR patents and licensing
opportunities for the most lucrative applications, while
Cetus would receive much-needed cash to shore up its
shaky financial situation. Ron Cape, Cetus's new chair-
man and CEO commented that, "PCR is worth more to
Roche than it is to us...Roche made us an offer we literally
could not refuse [23]." Cetus's financial troubles also
attracted attention from other biotech firms interested in
acquiring the struggling company. On July 23, 1991, Chi-
ron Corporation announced it had agreed to merge with
Cetus in a deal estimated at $660 million [23]. The merger
was contingent upon the sale of PCR to Roche. The PCR
deal was thus a crucial element in Cetus's survival through
its merger with Chiron.
However, before the Roche deal or the Chiron merger
could take place, Cetus had to deal with another legal
challenge. Kodak filed suit against on November 20,
1991, seeking an injunction to stop the transfer of PCR
Timeline of key events in the early development of PCR Figure 1
Timeline of key events in the early development of PCR.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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rights to Roche. Kodak claimed that under the terms of
their 1986 licensing agreement, neither party could trans-
fer the rights to the PCR-related technologies without the
consent of the other [14]. Kodak claimed they would suf-
fer "irreparable injury" by the transfer of the PCR assets,
particularly that Roche would receive "trade secrets and
know-how that are exclusively licensed to Kodak". The
court found Kodak may have suffered some harm from
Roche's involvement with Cetus, but the injury had
stemmed from the 1989 Cetus-Roche partnership; no fur-
ther harm was caused by the mere transfer of PCR owner-
ship [14]. Therefore, the motion for injunction was
denied, although Kodak was guaranteed a spot at the arbi-
tration hearing regarding new contractual obligations
On December 11, 1991, Hoffmann-La Roche formally
acquired the rights to PCR from Cetus for the price of
$300 million. Under the terms of the deal, Roche would
assume control of all access to PCR technology, although
Cetus (now merged with Chiron) would retain the right to
use PCR in the development of therapeutics [5]. The PECI
joint venture was dissolved and Roche entered into its
own alliance with Perkin-Elmer to continue the develop-
ment of PCR-related instruments [15]. The majority of the
Cetus PCR division personnel accepted new positions
with Roche, essentially preserving the old research team
under new management [6].
PCR licensing
The transfer of ownership was integral to the commercial
distribution of PCR technology. Cetus focused on applica-
tions for diagnostics. Roche planned to expand and com-
mercialize all possible applications of PCR, including its
role as a research tool in molecular biology [23]. To help
facilitate this, Roche formed a new subsidiary, Roche
Molecular Systems, to handle the manufacturing of rea-
gents and control the licensing of PCR rights to other com-
panies [5].
In 1991, over a thousand scientific papers cited one or
more of the original PCR publications. Despite the tech-
nology's widening use, researchers were increasingly
opposed to the old, Cetus licensing scheme. Early in the
development of PCR, Cetus had considered the imple-
mentation of reach-through licensing agreements
(RTLAs), which would have required users to pay Cetus
royalties on any invention or marketable product created
using PCR technology [24]. This plan was met with harsh
criticism from members of the scientific community. An
article in Business Week compared the arrangement to "a
software company demanding royalties from a best-sell-
ing author who used its word-processing program [25]."
Researchers also decried the high costs of purchasing
licensed reagents, like Taq polymerase, which cost nearly
twice as much as non-licensed products [26].
Roche announced a new, less imposing PCR licensing
strategy in January 1992. Roche Molecular stated that the
goals of the new policy were to: "1) expand and encourage
the use of the technology; 2) derive financial return from
the use of the technology by others; and 3) preserve the
value of the intellectual property and the patents that were
issued on it [24]." Roche created new categories of PCR
use, such as research applications and general DNA pro-
duction, with corresponding royalty and fee schedules.
The company also eliminated the $15,000 up-front fee
that Cetus had charged to non-profit and academic labs
and reduced the royalties on sales of PCR-based products
or tests to as low as 9 percent [27].
Roche, furthermore, made it easier to obtain a license to
encourage authorized use of the technology. Licenses
would now have two parts, an up-front fee component,
which could be satisfied simply by purchasing a thermal
cycler from an authorized dealer, and a "running royalty"
component, which required using licensed reagents to
perform PCR [26]. Additionally, Roche expanded the
potential uses of the technology by granting licenses for
applications in paternity testing and infectious disease
diagnostics, two fields for which the company had previ-
ously denied granting PCR rights [28]. PCR was now open
to more people, for use in more applications, than ever
before. Kathy Ordoñez, President of Roche Molecular Sys-
tems, proclaimed that the new arrangements would
"insure that PCR technology reaches its full potential as
rapidly as possible [28]." This move would hasten PCR's
diffusion into previously untapped markets, setting the
stage for PCR to become the  standard technology for
genetic testing.
Enforcing the patents
As the PCR market exploded in the early 1990s, so did the
temptation to find ways around obtaining proper licenses
for running reactions. Despite reducing PCR fees and
reducing use restrictions, widespread infringement of the
PCR process and product patents forced Roche to aggres-
sively assert its intellectual property rights. The company
attempted to monitor researchers who were running reac-
tions with unlicensed reagents or thermal cyclers. How-
ever, Roche stopped short of seeking damages from
scientists. Instead, the company chose to focus litigation
efforts on the companies who were making the infringe-
ment possible by selling unauthorized reagents and
instruments. The first of these suits was filed just months
after Roche gained control of the PCR patents.
Roche v. Promega
On October 27, 1992, Roche filed suit in Northern Cali-
fornia District Court against Promega Corporation for
infringement of patent number 4,889,818 (the '818 pat-
ent), which covered the purified nTaq polymerase used inJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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the PCR reaction. Two years earlier, Promega and Cetus
had entered into a licensing agreement, whereby Promega
was granted the right to manufacture, use, and sell Taq
polymerase only for non-PCR uses. The company was
offered the chance to purchase a license which included
selling Taq for use with PCR. Promega declined to pay five
times more for that right, asserting that there was a suffi-
cient market for non-PCR uses of Taq polymerase [29].
Under the licensing agreement, Promega paid $30,000
up-front costs and 10 percent royalties on all sales of Taq,
and was forbidden from all attempts to "advertise or oth-
erwise promote or directly or indirectly facilitate the use of
Licensed Products in PCR Applications [30]."
Roche claimed Promega had violated this portion of the
agreement by manufacturing products that were aimed at
encouraging customers to use them to perform PCR.
Promega had sold more than fifty million units of Taq
between July 1990 and June 1993. Roche was seeking
damages greater than $30 million to recoup the profits
that were lost by customers purchasing Taq from Promega
for use with PCR, instead of from another, fully-licensed
company [30]. The court wanted to know who was
infringing the PCR patents because of Promega's actions.
On May 16, 1995, Roche responded by providing the
court with a list of more than two hundred individuals,
including researchers working at such elite institutions as
the National Cancer Institute, the Howard Hughes Medi-
cal Institute, Stanford Medical School, M.I.T., and Harvard
University [31]. Roche publicly insisted that it did not
intend to sue any of the individuals or institutions on the
list, asserting that the fault was Promega's for encouraging
the infringement. Dennis Tramaloni, lead counsel for
Hoffmann La-Roche summarized the company's position:
"Promega has induced researchers engaged in highly prac-
tical research to infringe our patents...We're suing the
inducer, not suing the many parties who have been
induced [32]." While Roche's actions troubled many uni-
versity researchers, its stance was in line with the tradi-
tional corporate practice of "rational forbearance," the
overlooking of infringing activity because of the negative
stigma of suing non-profit organizations and the high
costs of litigation and low damage rewards [33]. Despite
the company's assurances, the announcement sent shock-
waves through the U.S. research community, as people
feared that Roche and other corporations might crack
down on "unauthorized" use of basic research tools [34].
Ultimately, however, the company maintained their
pledge and declined to bring charges against any individ-
uals or research centers.
Promega argued they could not be guilty of infringement
because the '818 patent should never have been granted
by the USPTO [35]. Promega formed two arguments to
support this assertion: the "invalidity" and the "inequita-
ble conduct" argument. [34] The "invalidity" argument
held that Cetus's patent claims were not sufficiently novel
to warrant the issuance of a patent. Promega argued that
Taq enzyme had been previously isolated by Chien and
colleagues at the University of Cincinnati [36] and Kale-
din and colleagues working in Moscow [37]. In fact,
Cetus's initial Taq patent application had been denied by
the patent examiner, who had concluded the Cetus claims
of the purified polymerase were not sufficiently novel
from the prior art to warrant a patent. Cetus re-petitioned
the examiner, this time successfully obtaining the patent
based on further evidence collected through their
research, which demonstrated the polymerase isolated by
the Chien and Kaledin groups were merely fragments of
the entire enzyme [35]. However, Promega presented evi-
dence at trial suggesting Cetus did not perform side-by-
side control experiments between their "purified" Taq
enzyme and the polymerase isolated by the Chien and
Kaledin groups, experiments that would have rendered
the claims obvious and unpatentable. The court found
that Cetus acted with "gross negligence" for failing to per-
form these crucial experiments [29].
The "inequitable conduct" argument was that Cetus had
obtained the patent by intentionally deceiving the
USPTO. The court agreed with Promega's claims, finding
that Cetus had committed "inequitable conduct" on no
fewer than eight separate occasions. The court found that,
among other things, Cetus had withheld key experimental
data, falsely suggested that they had performed compara-
tive experiments, and overrepresented the purity of the
isolated enzyme. On December 7, 1999, after more than
seven years of legal battles, Judge Vaughn Walker ruled
that the '818 patent covering nTaq polymerase was unen-
forceable [35]. Despite the verdict, Roche maintained that
the ruling would have little effect on profits, because 90
percent of the Taq polymerase sold was derived from the
recombinant form (rTaq), which is covered by separate
patents that were not affected by the ruling [38].
Roche appealed the ruling, and in March 2003 a U.S. Fed-
eral Court of Appeals ruled 2–1 to overturn two of the
"acts of misconduct" that Walker had cited in his opinion;
the court upheld the other six [39]. The court also ruled
that Judge Walker should reevaluate his ruling on whether
Cetus's actions were serious enough to warrant revocation
of their patents. In May 2004, Judge Walker upheld his
original ruling, finding that Cetus's actions were suffi-
ciently egregious to cause invalidation of the '818 patent
[40]. Since the original licensing agreement between
Roche and Promega was based on the validity of the '818
patent, Roche could not recoup damages for breech of
contract [41].Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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However, the news was not all bad for Roche. Judge
Walker did leave the door open for the company to pursue
damages from Promega for infringement of the '202 and
'195 patents. Promega argued that these claims should be
thrown out under the "unclean hands" doctrine, main-
taining that Cetus's "unconscionable acts" during the
obtaining of the '818 patent tainted their rights to the
related PCR patents [41]. The court found these argu-
ments unconvincing, and upheld the validity of the '195
and '202 patents. Litigation in this matter is ongoing.
Applera/Roche v. MJ research
In June 1998, when Roche brought suit against instru-
ment manufacturer MJ Research, the company was joined
by Applera at the plaintiff's table. MJ had produced ther-
mal cyclers throughout the early 1990s, which, they
claimed, had many other uses besides PCR operations. In
1994, the company entered into negotiations with
Applied Biosystems about becoming a licensed dealer,
allowing them to market their thermal cyclers for PCR
[42]. After four years of fruitless talks, Applied Biosystems
(through Applera) and Roche filed suit against MJ, claim-
ing that they had been directly infringing three of the key
thermal cyclers patents (US 5,333,675 ['675 patent], US
5,475,610 ['610 patent], and US 5,656,493 ['493 patent]),
as well as inducing their customers to violate the three
central PCR patents.
The trial did not begin until March 2004. Roche and
Applera maintained that MJ Research and its two found-
ers, brothers John and Michael Finney, had intentionally
infringed the thermal cycler patents by willingly selling
them to customers who they knew would use the
machines for performing PCR. Several key pieces of evi-
dence presented by Roche supporting this argument. For
example, Roche and Applera showed pictures of MJ's web-
site, taken before the trial began, in which their thermal
cyclers were described as being adapted for PCR use. The
websites had since been changed and the word "PCR"
deleted. MJ claimed they did not know for what purposes
their customers used the machines, but the plaintiffs
showed a survey demonstrating that 96 percent of
researchers who bought cyclers from MJ used them specif-
ically to perform PCR reactions [42]. On April 28, 2004,
the jury found MJ guilty of infringing all three of the ther-
mal cycler patents, and inducing infringement of the PCR
process patents. The jury also found that MJ and its found-
ers had "willfully" infringed both the PCR process patents
and the '493 thermal cycler patent. The jury awarded dam-
ages in the total amount of $19.8 million (see Table 1),
for which MJ Research was found 90 percent liable, and
John and Michael Finney each personally liable for 5 per-
cent [43].
Based on the deliberate nature of MJ's infringement,
Roche and Applera sought enhanced damages. By law, the
court could increase the original damages by up to three
times, if the guilty party's behavior had been "reprehensi-
ble" or "egregious." As evidence of MJ's blatant guilt,
Judge Janet Arterton cited testimony of past instances
when MJ had given away free PCR kits when customers
purchased thermal cyclers. The company had later fol-
lowed up with these same customers "to both inquire
whether the customers wanted another free PCR kit and to
sell PCR kits [44]." Judge Arterton found sufficient mis-
conduct to double the damages for infringement of the
PCR patents and the '493 patent, the only patents which
the jury had determined were "willfully" violated. In
March 2005, the court increased damages from the origi-
nal $19.8 million to $35.4 million, again with MJ
Research responsible for 90 percent of the payment, and
the Finney brothers each personally liable for 5 percent
[44].
Discussion and evaluation
While many of the patents on PCR still remain active, the
expiration of the core process patents has brought the
story of PCR full circle, providing a unique opportunity to
reflect over the technology's effect over the past two dec-
ades. Financially, PCR has been a successful technology
for its many rights-holders. In addition to evaluating
financial data, it is also important to consider the role pat-
enting and licensing of PCR have played in the dissemina-
tion of the technology in the scientific community.
Patent expiration
On March 28, 2005, the first of the key PCR process pat-
ents expired in the United States. Reactions are mixed,
Table 1: Damages awarded in Roche v. MJ Research.
Patent MJ Research (90%) Michael Finney (5%) John Finney (5%)
Process Patents $12,474,000 $693,000 $693,000
'675 $2,673,000 $148,500 $148,500
'493 $1,603,800 $89,100 $89,100
'610 $1,069,200 $59,400 $59,400
Total Damages $17,820,000 $990,000 $990,000
Total Increased Damages $31,897,800 $1,772,100 $1,772,100
All amounts in US dollars. [43], [44]Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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with most observers undecided about the short- and long-
term economic effects. Roche and the other PCR stake-
holders maintain that they expect licensees to "honor the
terms of their contracts", and that the losses in revenue
should be kept to a minimum [45]. Despite the expira-
tions, the companies still own the rights to dozens of PCR
patents, the last of which won't expire until 2017 [15]. In
addition, Roche, like other large companies such as
Microsoft and Intel, is constantly modifying and upgrad-
ing its techniques and products, and should remain the
key player in PCR for years to come [46]. Tom White, now
the Chief Scientific Officer at Celera Diagnostics, believes
that these new PCR methods, such as Real-Time PCR (RT-
PCR) will ensure the technology's viability even after the
core patents expire:
"Most of the ways people do PCR now is based on
advances in the technology that have gone beyond the
fundamental underlying patents...much more compli-
cated versions of the process that was patented in 1987. So
the fact that the fundamental patents have expired I don't
think makes any difference, really...[47]"
However, many claim that the patent expirations could
cut into PCR profits. In a recent quarterly report, Applied
Biosystems predicted that the loss of the PCR patents
could negatively impact royalty income. One San Fran-
cisco investment bank estimates that the patent expira-
tions will cost Applied nearly $25 million annually [15].
Regardless of the impacts on PCR's parent companies,
many experts in the molecular biology industry seem to
believe that prices for reagents and instruments should
drop, allowing PCR to spread into fields where, previ-
ously, the technique's use had been limited [45]. Environ-
mental research and diagnostic applications are two fields
where expansion in PCR use could occur. Andy Bertera of
GE Healthcare claims that the effects could be felt most
strongly in these areas because "cost is more of an
issue...you've got a larger number of samples [45]." A drop
in prices could also trigger the use of PCR into entirely
new areas, such as tropical disease drug discovery, where
high costs had been prohibitively expensive [46]. The
reduction in costs could be rather large, claims Mark
Finney, founder of Promega. He says that most companies
could lower the unit price of reagent from 18 to 20 cents
to just 3 to 4 cents, while still maintaining the same profit
margin. He believes that reduced costs will "fuel a signifi-
cant rise in the use of PCR [45]."
Evaluating effects of intellectual property
PCR has earned huge sums of money in royalties for the
various rights-holders while also becoming one of the
most important research tools in molecular biology. In
addition to Kary Mullis' $10,000 bonus and the $300 mil-
lion earned by Cetus in selling the PCR patents, it is esti-
mated that Roche has earned upwards of $2 billion in
royalties from licensing the technology [40]. Of course,
much of that money has come from the pockets of
researchers, universities, and taxpayers, in the form of
licensing fees, which could have been devoted to other
research purposes. On the other hand, a significant por-
tion of that revenue has gone to fueling further research
and development for the companies that have controlled
the patents.
When assessing the role of patenting in the development
of PCR, two questions stand out: 1) did patents spur tech-
nological innovation, and 2) did the intellectual property
constraints of PCR affect its dissemination? Broad patent
rights and strict enforcement are necessary, many would
argue, in order to provide incentives for the costly research
and development of new technologies on the part of pri-
vate companies. If a company cannot be assured intellec-
tual property protection for potentially lucrative
discoveries, they may be unwilling to devote significant
resources into the technology in the first place. PCR
presents an interesting example, since most of its more
valuable applications were discovered serendipitously,
not as the result of a deliberate, corporate strategy. The
Cetus management was opposed to diverting resources
toward the seemingly less-profitable PCR technology. So,
patent protection had little bearing on the initial discov-
ery of PCR. However, intellectual property protection did
play an important part thereafter. While the patents did
not drive the search for PCR, it did give Cetus some moti-
vation to further the technology's development in-house.
Without patent protection, and the possibility of rights to
future revenue, it seems less likely that Cetus would have
devoted any of the necessary resources that contributed to
PCR's development.
Patent protection may have been essential to spur on
PCR's development within Cetus, but if these same rights
hinder the ability of researchers to use the technology,
then the net effects might be undesirable. PCR represents
a unique challenge because it is such an essential research
tool, an almost ubiquitous process used in dozens of dif-
ferent settings in almost every branch of biology. To
restrict its use could stifle discoveries that might have sig-
nificant benefit for science and healthcare.
There appear to be essentially two different, but related
hurdles to using PCR: the cost of performing the reaction
and obtaining access to the property rights. Most com-
plaints about access to PCR seem to focus on licensing fees
and royalties (particularly with regards to the cost of Taq
enzyme), which have made PCR prohibitively expensive
in some fields. As noted above, the expiration of the core
PCR patents is expected to open up new areas of research,Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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such as environmental studies, where the costs associated
with performing PCR may have made the technique
unpopular. Maynard Olson, professor of genome sciences
at the University of Washington, told Science in 2001 that
"there would be a lot more genotyping done if it only cost
a penny for the Taq [38]." A summary of a 1996 National
Academy workshop on intellectual property and research
tools reported that "discussion about access to PCR tech-
nology centered on the costs of Taq polymerase, rather
than on the distribution of intellectual property rights
[24]."
Despite complaints from the scientific community sur-
rounding the cost of performing PCR, it appears as if the
licensing of the technology has generally not demonstra-
bly hindered access by researchers. PCR clearly spread
throughout the scientific research community; one would
be hard pressed to find a molecular biology lab in the
world that does not employ the technique on a regular
basis. Roche's business plans have not, apparently, pre-
vented researchers – at least in biomedical research fields
– from accessing PCR when they need it. One place it was
of particular use was in DNA sequencing. Tom White,
now the Chief Scientific Officer at Celera Diagnostics,
points out that PCR was "used in every phase of the
Human Genome Project for the storage and recovery of
sequence information [48]." Tom Caskey, a past-presi-
dent of the Human Genome Organization, asserted in
1997 that "if we did not have free access to PCR as a
research tool, the genome project really would be undoa-
ble [24]."
One rough metric by which to measure the adoption of a
technology is to evaluate citation trends. This measure
approximates the use of technology by counting the
number of times publications reference the initial descrip-
tion of the technology in the scientific literature. Figures
3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) compare the citation trends of the two
original PCR papers (Saiki et. al., 1985 and Mullis and
Faloona, 1987) with the pBR322 cloning vector [49] and
the Maxam-Gilbert sequencing method [50]. Both of
these comparison technologies are non-patented, widely-
used research tools. The qualitative similarities are appar-
ent, a quick rise in the number of publications, a peak,
then gradual decline, finally settling into a relatively con-
stant range. To adjust for the differences in absolute num-
bers of citation, Figure 3d shows normalized citation data,
presenting the percent of total citations in a given year for
each technology.
A more quantitative approach to evaluating the citation
trends can be found in Figure 4. Figure 4a shows a para-
metric plot of PCR citations versus Maxam-Gilbert cita-
tions, and Figure 4b shows PCR versus pBR322, with both
plots using years since original publication as the inde-
pendent variable. The plot of PCR versus Maxam-Gilbert
has a strong positive Pearson correlation coefficient (R =
0.8425, p < 0.05), indicating a strong linear correlation
between these two variables. [51] The plot of PCR versus
pBR322 has an even larger correlation coefficient (R =
0.9055, p < 0.05).
Thus, in these graphs, we can see that the dissemination
patterns for PCR (a patented technology with a strict, yet
permissive licensing strategy) and unpatented, freely
available technologies are very similar. This may suggest,
at least in the case of PCR, that patenting did not severely
hamper the dissemination of the technology, as compared
to the dissemination of the two unpatented research tools
pBR322 cloning vector and Maxam-Gilbert DNA sequenc-
ing methods. Our data does not take into account the pos-
sibility that researchers using unlicensed reagents or
instruments may be less likely to cite the PCR publications
if they believe that Cetus/Roche would send them a cease
and desist letter. Also, our analysis cannot estimate how
dissemination might have been different without a patent
in the particular case of PCR.
The first year in which the number of papers citing PCR
declined was 1992, the year that Roche announced the
easing of licensing fees and restrictions. One would
assume that the reduction in the cost of performing PCR
and the ease of access to the technology would have
caused a surge in the number of papers which cited PCR,
encouraged by lowered prices of reagents and instru-
ments. The fact that this did not occur suggests that the
access to PCR was not unduly restricted before the lower-
ing of fees and restrictions, and that the use of PCR in
research (at least as evidenced by the citations) followed a
natural pattern for similar research tools, regardless of its
patent and licensing status. Citation trends appear to have
a natural decline over time. This may be due to the con-
Cetus Corporation income, 1984–1990 Figure 2
Cetus Corporation income, 1984–1990. All figures in U.S. 
dollars. Source: Cetus SEC filings 1985–1990.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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ception that the technology is now public knowledge,
which no longer requires citation, or the technology is
replaced by newer or derivative technologies.
Conclusion
While intellectual property protection was undoubtedly
key to the various firms' ability to capitalize financially,
these same rights did not preclude widespread adoption
of the technology. The ability of PCR to become almost
universally adopted while earning billions of dollars in
revenue suggests that business practices that permit broad
use and those that maintain profitability are not mutually
exclusive. Since this example runs counter to the common
assumption that strong patent rights are incompatible
with widespread dissemination, it is important to exam-
ine this case history and see what factors prevented IP
rights from hindering PCR's broad adoption. Based on
our analysis of the history of PCR, there appear to be four
key reasons why the technology's use has become so wide-
spread, despite stringent patent protections:
￿ Cetus/Roche's extensive use of licensing and business
partnerships,
￿ Fair and adaptable licensing strategies,
￿ Ease of obtaining licenses, and
Citation trends Figure 3
Citation trends. (a)-(c) Scientific papers citing PCR, pBR322 cloning vector, and Maxam-Gilbert sequencing by year after initial 
publication. Citation counts were obtained by searching Web of Science citation databases by year for articles referencing the 
seminal publication for each technology. Counts begin with the first full year after publication. For PCR, the citation count 
includes references to both the 1985 Saiki paper and the 1987 Mullis paper. (d) Normalized citation data. Y-axis represents 
percent of total citations in a given year for each technology. X-axis in all graphs (a-d) represents years after initial publication.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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￿ Widespread infringement by researchers, coupled with
reluctance on the part of Cetus/Roche to sue individuals.
Early in PCR's development, a conscious and crucial deci-
sion was made on the part of Cetus to allow outside cor-
porations to access the technology through licenses and
business partnerships. This decision had tremendous con-
sequences on the development and dissemination of the
technology. The partnership with Perkin-Elmer (and later
Applied Biosystems) led to the discovery of PCR as a
research tool and to its automation, allowing the process
to become widely available on the market and easy-to-
use. The ventures with Roche and Kodak resulted in key
diagnostic applications, which created a whole new mar-
ket and spurred the discovery of PCR-based tests for a
number of diseases. The use of nonexclusive licensing per-
mitted broad access to PCR and prevented Cetus and/or
Roche from having a monopoly on uses. Having many
firms with rights to manufacture and sell reagents has led
to competitive pricing, ensuring that costs are as low as
they can be, subject to the obligatory royalties linked to
the exclusive patent rights.
Another reason for PCR's dissemination may also have
been linked to Roche's loosening of restrictions on
licenses after it acquired rights to the technology. Roche
appears to have responded to scientists' concerns about
prohibitively high costs, and altered its licensing strategy
in an attempt to encourage broad use of their technology.
Tom Caskey claims that Roche "has behaved fantastically"
in allowing researchers access to PCR technology [24].
Bernard Poiesz, director of the Central New York Regional
Oncology Center, says that even though Roche's PCR
licensing fees "are some of the highest royalty rates I have
personally experienced", he knew of no other company
that did a better job of making its technology available for
research purposes [24].
Since each part of the PCR process – the reaction itself, the
Taq enzyme, reagents, thermal cyclers – are all covered by
separate patents, there exists the possibility that the trans-
action costs associated with obtaining permission and
paying licensing fees did reduce some uses. Why, then, are
such effects not clear-cut? One answer may lie in the ease
with which licenses are obtained. Since the licenses are
obtained simply by purchasing authorized instruments
and reagents, there is no additional burden placed on the
individual researcher beyond the higher cost caused by
the patent royalty.
Walsh and colleagues have suggested another reason why
patents have had little effect on the use of research tools:
infringement [52]. Many researchers, either because they
do not know or care, or because they have the impression
that their work is protected under a "research use exemp-
tion," simply infringe the PCR patents, running reactions
without purchasing licensed instruments or reagents [52].
The Promega and MJ Research legal cases demonstrate
that some vendors will sell unlicensed PCR reagents at sig-
nificantly lower prices than their licensed counterparts.
Most of the time, researchers can continue to use the rea-
gents with few or no repercussions. Companies have been
quick to enforce their patent rights when the infringing
parties are other firms, but have been "reluctant to enforce
their patents against universities...because of the low dam-
age awards and bad publicity that suing a university
would entail [52]." Suits filed by firms against academic
institutions are exceedingly rare. One commentator found
out that aside from the Madey v. Duke case in 2002 (307 F
3d. 1351), she could locate only one other instance of a
Linear correlations Figure 4
Linear correlations. (a) Parametric plot of PCR citations ver-
sus Maxam-Gilbert citations, with calculated Pearson corre-
lation coefficient and p value. (b) Parametric plot of PCR 
citations versus pBR322 citations, with calculated Pearson 
correlation coefficient and p value.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:7 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/7
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company suing a university for direct infringement, dating
from 1967 (John J. McMullen Associates v. State Board of
Higher Education, 268 F. Supp. 735 [D. Or. 1967]) [53].
This toleration of infringement, termed "rational forbear-
ance" in a 1997 report by the National Research Council,
has become an industry norm which seems to play a sig-
nificant role in ensuring the broad use of many genomic
technologies by researchers [24]. While this behavior is
the norm in industry/academia relations, cases such as the
DuPont oncomouse, CreLox genetic technologies, and
B R C A  g e n e  p a t e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  v i e w e d  b y  m a n y  i n  t h e
research community as examples of intellectual property
rights-holders stifling innovative activity by excessive reg-
ulation of the uses of their products [24]. Furthermore,
the  Madey v. Duke decision in 2002, which effectively
eliminated the ability of universities to hide behind the
vague "research use exemption," may embolden compa-
nies to take legal action against nonprofit and academic
researchers and universities. It appears that industry
norms are still governing firm behavior and dissuading
suits against nonprofits, but there is no way to know
whether this pattern will hold, given today's legal climate.
The case of PCR demonstrates one such instance in which
researchers and rights-holders were able to develop an
informal compromise, allowing sufficient access to the
technology while maintaining its value. However, while
infringement coupled with "rational forbearance" played
a role in PCR's dissemination, there is some doubt as to
whether researchers will be able to rely on this mechanism
in the future.
Our work, while far from conclusive, seems to suggest that
in the case of the polymerase chain reaction, intellectual
property rights did not preclude the technology from
being adopted as widely and as quickly as other, non-pat-
ented research tools. Furthermore, PCR's financial success
implies that broad adoption of a platform technology
does not require business practices which undermine the
technology's profitability. Thus, it appears that some fears
about the effects of intellectual property on research tool
use can be overcome through appropriate licensing strate-
gies and other behaviors on the part of corporate entities
which control these patents.
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